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1 INTRODUCTION  
The relationship between corporate govern-
ance and firm performance has become a hot 
topic to study by researchers in developed 
countries. In recent years, this issue is also 
discussed in developing countries due to the 
corporate collapse and fraud modes. The 
company collapsed due to a weak corporate 
governance system; thereby, they need to im-
prove and reform their governance structure. 
Good corporate governance may contribute to 
accounting fraud, and companies with weak 
governance structures are more vulnerable to 
accounting fraud (Berkman et al., 2009 in 
Arora and Sharma, 2016). The failure to pre-
vent fraud sparks much debate about the ef-
fectiveness of the current corporate govern-
ance regulations, principles, structures, and 
mechanisms (Sun et al., 2011 in Arora and 
Sharma, 2016). 
Good corporate governance also refers to a 
set of rules and incentives where company
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This study aims to examine the effects of corporate governance on the performance of manufac-
turing sector companies listed on the Indonesia and Philippines Stock Exchanges over the 2015-
2019 period. This research uses a quantitative approach with a multiple linear regression meth-
od. The object used in this research was 455 observation data on Indonesia Stock Exchange and 
170 observation data on the Philippines Stock Exchange. The dependent variables in this study 
are ROA which represents accounting-based, and Tobin's Q, which represents market-based. 
Then, the independent variables in this study are board size, board meetings, institutional owner-
ship, while the control variables are leverage and firm size. The results showed that board size 
has no significant effect on ROA in Indonesia and the Philippines but negatively affects Tobin's 
Q in Indonesia and the Philippines. The board meeting negatively affects ROA in Indonesia and 
positively affects ROA in the Philippines. But board meeting also has no significant effect to 
Tobin's Q in both Indonesia and Philippines. Institutional ownership has no significant effect on 
ROA in Indonesia and positively affects Tobin's Q in Indonesia. But institutional ownership also 
has a significant negative effect on ROA and Tobin's Q in Filipina. Whereas in the control varia-
bles, leverage negatively affects ROA and Tobin's Q in Indonesia and the Philippines. Firm size 
has a significant positive effect on ROA in Indonesia and the Philippines and has a significant 
negative effect on Tobin's Q in Indonesia. Firm size also has no significant effect on Tobin's Q 
in the Philippines. 
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management is directed and controlled (Vel-
namphy, 2013 in Muchtar and Darari, 2013). 
Agency problem theory stipulates that a com-
pany director will be more careful in manag-
ing his own money than other people's money 
(Letza et al., 2004 in Arora and Sharma, 
2016). This theory also states that the primary 
goal of good corporate governance is to assure 
shareholders that managers work to achieve 
the results desired by shareholders (Shleifer 
and Vishny, 1997 in Arora and Sharma, 
2016). 
Arora and Sharma (2016), who study "The 
effects of good corporate governance on firm 
performance use the dependent variables of 
return on assets (ROA), return on equity 
(ROE), Tobin's Q, net profit margin (NPM), 
and stock return (SR). While the independent 
variables used are square of board size (BS), 
square of board meetings (BM), square of a 
proportion of outsider directors (PO), CEO 
duality (CEO dual), and institutional owner-
ship (IO) by considering firm age, leverage, 
firm size, advertising intensity (AdvInt), and 
research & development intensity (RDInt) as 
the control variables. This study shows that 
the effects of BM and IO on firm performance 
measured by ROA, ROE, and SR are insignif-
icant positive. They have a significant nega-
tive effect on NPM and a significant positive 
effect on Tobin's Q. CEO dual has an insignif-
icant negative effect on ROA, ROE, and SR. 
However, CEO dual has an insignificant posi-
tive on NPM and Tobin's Q. PO has an insig-
nificant positive effect on ROA and ROE has 
an insignificant negative effect on NPM and 
SR. A significant negative on Tobin's Q. BS 
has an insignificant negative effect on ROE 
and SR, a significant negative effect on ROA, 
an insignificant positive effect on NPM, and a 
significant positive effect on Tobin's Q. 
In the control variables, leverage has an insig-
nificant negative effect on ROE, Tobin's Q, 
and SR, but has a significant negative effect 
on ROA and NPM. Meanwhile, size has an 
insignificant negative effect on ROA and 
Tobin's Q, a significant positive effect on 
NPM and SR, and an insignificant positive ef-
fect on ROE. 
Malik and Makdoom (2016) who also 
study "The effects of good corporate govern-
ance on firm performance use the dependent 
variables: ROA, Tobin's Q, and SR. Mean-
while, the independent variables used are 
board size (BS), board independence (BI), 
board meetings (BM), large shareholders 
(LS), and CEO compensation (CC) which also 
considering firm size and leverage as the con-
trol variables. The results of this study reveal 
that BS has a significant negative effect on 
ROA, Tobin's Q, and SR. BM has an insignif-
icant negative effect on ROA and SR, but has 
a significant positive effect on Tobin's Q. 
Then BI has a significant positive effect on 
ROA, Tobin's Q, and SR. LS has an insignifi-
cant positive effect on ROA, Tobin's Q, and 
SR. Meanwhile, CC has a significant negative 
effect on ROA and Tobin's Q, but has an in-
significant negative effect on SR. 
Haji dan Mubaraq (2015) who study the 
same topic, use the dependent variables: 
ROA, ROE, and Tobin's Q. The independent 
variables used in this study are board size 
(BS), board meetings (BM), independence di-
rector (INDs), family members on board 
(FMB), position of the chairperson (INDCP), 
director ownership (DIROWN), government 
ownership (GO) and institutional ownership 
(IO). The results of this study reveal that BS, 
BM, and IO have a significant negative effect 
on ROA and Tobin's Q, but BM has an insig-
nificant positive effect on ROE. BS has an in-
significant negative effect on ROE. INDs 
have a significant negative effect on ROA, an 
insignificant positive effect on ROE, and an 
insignificant negative on Tobin's Q. 
Then FMB has a significant negative effect on 
ROA and Tobin's Q, an insignificant positive 
effect on ROE, and INDCP has a significant 
positive effect on ROA, ROE and Tobin's Q. 
DIROWN has an insignificant positive effect 
on ROA, a significant negative effect on 
ROE, and an insignificant negative effect on 
Tobin's Q. Meanwhile, GOVOWN has a sig-
nificant negative effect on ROA and ROE, but 
an insignificant negative effect on Tobin's Q. 
Firm size, which is the control variable of this 
study, has a significant positive effect on 
ROA and Tobin's Q but has an insignificant 
positive effect on ROE. Meanwhile, the sec-
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ond control variable, leverage, has a negative 
significant negative effect on ROA and ROE 
and an insignificant negative effect on Tobin's 
Q.  
1.1 Literature Review  
This study is different from previous research. 
It discusses the effects of good corporate gov-
ernance on manufacturing companies' perfor-
mance listed on the Composite Stock Price 
Index (IHSG), representing the Indonesia 
Stock Exchange compared to the manufactur-
ing companies listed on the Philippines Stock 
Exchange (PSE).  
The manufacturing sector is chosen be-
cause it contributes the second largest number 
of companies in the Top 50 Companies ac-
cording to the Indonesian Institute for Corpo-
rate Directorship (IICD). While the Philippine 
Stock Exchange was chosen because, accord-
ing to the 2018 Asian Corporate Governance 
Association (ACGA), the Philippines has a 
CG score almost similar to the Indonesian CG 
score. 
According to Klein (1998), a larger num-
ber of commissioners leads the firm's man-
agement to be more effective in adapting to 
the complexities of the business environment 
and organizational culture. In addition, a larg-
er number of commissioners can gather more 
information; thus, the number of commission-
ers seems to be better for firm performance. A 
larger board of directors can also reduce indi-
vidual weaknesses through collective deci-
sion-making. 
H1: Board size has a positive effect on firm 
performance. 
According to Arora & Sharma (2016), the 
number of board meetings has a significant 
positive effect on firm performance. When the 
board of commissioners meets frequently, 
they tend to discuss problems faced by the 
firm, find solutions, and carry out their duties 
according to the shareholders’ wishes. There-
by, more frequent board meetings are needed 
to improve firm performance. In addition, 
commissioners who have more time to discuss 
tend to make better decisions in response to 
crises because time constraints are seen as a 
major barrier to a more active monitoring by 
the board of commissioners. 
H2: Board meetings have a positive effect on 
firm performance. 
According to Lee (2009), firms with great-
er institutional ownership will perform better 
because institutional investors have the re-
sources and the ability to monitor manage-
ment decisions well.  
H3: Institutional ownership has a positive ef-
fect on firm performance.  
2 RESEARCH METHODS  
This study is basic research because it intends 
to develop research that has been done previ-
ously. When viewed from various basic re-
search types, this study is causal research, 
which examines the effects of the independent 
variables: board size, board meetings, and in-
stitutional ownership and the control varia-
bles: firm size and leverage on the dependent 
variables: ROA and Tobin's Q in manufactur-
ing companies listed on the Indonesia and 
Philippines Stock Exchanges over the 2015–
2019 period. This study used secondary data 
in the form of financial reports of all manu-
facturing companies listed on the Indonesia 
and Philippines Stock Exchanges over the 
2015-2019 period. The dependent variables 
used in this study were ROA and Tobin's Q. 
The independent variables used were board 
size, board meetings, institutional ownership, 
and control variables: firm size and leverage. 
This study applied one equation as follows: 
 
𝑅𝑂𝐴𝑖,𝑡, 𝑇𝑜𝑏𝑖𝑛





+ 𝜀    (1) 
Note: 
   : Return on Asset firm i, in year- t 
 : Tobin’s Q firm i, in year- t 
          : Board Size firm i, in year- t 
         : Board Meetings  firm i, in year- t 
        : Institutional Ownership firm i, in year- t 
        : Firm Size firm i, in year- t 
       : Leverage firm i, in year- t  
Β          : Coefficient Regression  
           : Error 
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3 RESULTS AND DISCUSSIONS  
This study uses a sample of manufacturing 
companies listed on the Indonesia and Philip-
pines Stock Exchanges over the 2015-2019 
period. The final sample consists of 455 ob-
servational data for the Indonesian sample and 
170 observation data for the Philippines sam-
ple. Regressions result are shown in the table 
bellow 
 




BS -0.001445 0.2301 
BM -0.000948 0.0216** 




LEV -0.131831 0.0000*** 
FS 0.034787 0.0000*** 
 




BS -0.019456 0.0000*** 
BM 0.000782 0.6639 




LEV -0.518239 0.0000*** 
FS -0.050347 0.0038*** 
 
Table 3. Regression Result: ROA Filipina 
 




BS -0.069041 0.0864* 
BM 0.023935 0.3161 
IO -2.288162 0.0010*** 
Control Var-
iable   
LEV -0.590490 0.0616* 
FS -0.068730 0.1947 
 
Based on Tables 1 and 3, the board size (BS) 
has an insignificant effect on firm perfor-
mance based on ROA in Indonesia and the 
Philippines. This result indicates that the 
number of BS does not affect firm perfor-
mance based on ROA. The number of BS in 
carrying out its supervisory function does not 
have a major effect on managerial decisions in 
determining firm policy. The firm needs a 
board of commissioners with competence in 
finance/accounting and has business experi-
ence more than a large number of commis-
sioners. In other words, board size does not 
determine the company profits (Ratnadi and 
Ulupui, 2016).  
However, Tables 2 and 4 show that BS has 
a significant negative effect on firm perfor-
mance based on Tobin's Q in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. This result indicates that the 
more the BS, the worse the firm performance 
based on Tobin's Q. This is because more BS 
will weaken communication among the 
boards and make the coordination difficult, 
thus challenging to make effective decisions. 
Therefore, the decision used is often the most 
vote that does not necessarily have a good ef-
fect on firm performance, which can cause in-
vestors to feel pessimistic about the firm (Ma-
lik and Makdoom (2016)). These results are 
supported by the fact that both Indonesia and 
the Philippines apply a system that separates 
the board into directors and commissioners. 
Based on Table 1, the board meeting (BM) 
has a significant negative effect on firm per-
formance based on ROA in Indonesia. This 
result indicates that the more the BS, the 
worse the firm performance based on ROA. 
This is due to the high costs that must be in-
curred to organize the meeting. Costs incurred 
can be in the form of wasted time spent by 
members of the board of commissioners 
which can actually be used for doing other 
important tasks, travel costs, and other costs 
that must be spent in organizing the meeting. 
Table 3 shows that BM has a significant 
positive effect on firm performance based on 
ROA in the Philippines. This result is in line 
with the proposed hypothesis, where the more 
the BM, the better the firm performance based 




BS -0.000433 0.6047 
BM 0.004727 0.0000*** 
IO -0.071660 0.0059*** 
Control Var-
iable   
LEV -0.170396 0.0000*** 
FS 0.023430 0.0000*** 
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commissioners to monitor and implement 
company strategy effectively. As such, more 
frequent meetings will increase the role of the 
board of commissioners in controlling manag-
ers and other benefits that have a positive ef-
fect on firm performance. This is supported 
by the level of discipline 59.6 or above the 
mean by the board of commissioners in the 
Philippines to carry out its functions in the 
form of board of commissioners’ meetings. 
Then, in Tables 2 and 4, it can be seen that 
BM has an insignificant effect on firm per-
formance based on Tobin's Q in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. This result indicates that the 
number of BM has no effect on firm perfor-
mance. However, this can be explained by 
routine board meetings, which allow the board 
of commissioners to have more time to nego-
tiate, define strategies, and assess managerial 
performance. Thus, this will help the board of 
commissioners to stay informed and knowl-
edgeable about important firm problems. 
Table 1 exhibits that institutional owner-
ship (IO) has an insignificant effect on firm 
performance based on ROA in Indonesia. This 
result indicates that the amount of IO does not 
affect firm performance based on ROA. How-
ever, firms with large IO are recognized to 
perform better because institutional investors 
have the resources and ability to monitor 
management decisions properly. Institutional 
investors also provide input to management in 
managing the firm, but it seems that these in-
puts do not affect firm performance improve-
ment. Share ownership that is concentrated in 
the institution offers better control to monitor 
management actions actively and prevent 
management's opportunistic behavior for its 
personal goals. Table 2 shows that IO has a 
significant positive effect on firm perfor-
mance based on Tobin's Q in Indonesia. This 
result is in line with the proposed hypothesis, 
where the greater the IO, the better the firm 
performance based on Tobin's Q. With large 
institutional ownership, the level of control 
exercised by the external party of the compa-
ny will be stronger. Firms with institutional 
ownership related to the business family have 
a good performance. Their existence prevents 
the occurrence of perquisites by company 
management which can cause agency costs. 
The fact that most institutional investors in 
Indonesia have close relationships with their 
firms. In addition, the amount of institutional 
ownership is a signal for other firms, which 
indicates that the firm has potential for profit-
ability, causing demand for firm shares to in-
crease so that it can increase the value of the 
company's shares. Then, in Tables 3 and 4, IO 
has a significant negative effect on firm per-
formance based on ROA and Tobin's Q in the 
Philippines. This result indicates that the 
greater the IO, the worse the firm perfor-
mance based on Tobin's Q. Based on a report 
from the Credit Suisse Research Institute 
(2010), 80% of firms in the Philippines have 
institutional ownership in the family business. 
However, its existence does not control the 
firm directly but is limited by supervision, so 
that various policies made by the firm are 
purely from the management side. Therefore, 
this negative result indicates that institutional 
investors are not carrying out their role cor-
rectly, but they only rely on firm management 
to manage the firm. 
Based on Tables 1, 2, 3, and 4, it can be 
seen that leverage (LEV) has a significant 
negative effect on firm performance based on 
ROA and Tobin's Q in Indonesia and the Phil-
ippines. This result indicates that the greater 
the LEV, the worse the firm performance 
based on ROA and Tobin's Q. A large LEV 
creates complexity for the firm in fulfilling its 
financial obligations to creditors. Then, the 
profits generated by the firm will be used to 
pay debts, interest to creditors so that firms 
with low leverage tend to have better perfor-
mance. 
Based on Tables 1 and 3, it can be seen 
that firm size (FS) has a significant positive 
effect on firm performance based on ROA in 
Indonesia and the Philippines. This result in-
dicates that the bigger the FS, the better the 
firm performance based on ROA because 
large-size firms have easier access to external 
capital and better governance structures to be 
more effective than small-size firms.  
Table 2 shows that FS has a negative effect on 
firm performance based on Tobin's Q in Indo-
nesia. This result indicates that the bigger the 
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FS, the worse the firm performance based on 
Tobin's Q because small-size firms tend to 
have less risk, making it more attractive for 
investors to invest and eventually raise the 
firm's stock price. Likewise, investors tend to 
avoid large-size firms because they have a 
high risk. Then, in Table 4, FS has an insig-
nificant effect on firm performance based on 
Tobin's Q in the Philippines. This result indi-
cates that FS does not affect firm performance 
based on Tobin's Q because firm size, as 
measured by the natural logarithm of sales, 
does not reflect the actual sales value; thus, 
firm size cannot guarantee good firm perfor-
mance. 
4 CONCLUSION  
This study results show that Board Size (BS) 
has no effect on firm performance based on 
ROA in Indonesia and the Philippines. How-
ever, BS has a significant negative effect on 
firm performance based on Tobin's Q in Indo-
nesia and the Philippines. Board Meeting 
(BM) has a significant negative effect on firm 
performance based on ROA in Indonesia and 
a significant positive effect on firm perfor-
mance based on ROA in the Philippines. 
However, BM has no effect on firm perfor-
mance based on Tobin's Q in Indonesia and 
the Philippines. Institutional ownership has no 
effect on firm performance based on ROA in 
Indonesia. IO has a significant positive effect 
on firm performance based on Tobin's Q in 
Indonesia and a significant negative effect on 
firm performance based on ROA and Tobin's 
Q in the Philippines. 
For the control variables, leverage has a 
significant negative effect on firm perfor-
mance based on ROA and Tobin's Q in the 
Philippines. Furthermore, Firm Size (FS) has 
a significant positive effect on firm perfor-
mance based on ROA in Indonesia and the 
Philippines, a significant negative effect on 
firm performance based on Tobin's Q in Indo-
nesia, and no effect on firm performance 
based on Tobin's Q in the Philippines. 
This study can be used as a reference for 
further research. This study has limitations, 
including the research period used and its fo-
cuses only on manufacturing sector compa-
nies listed on the Indonesia and Philippines 
Stock Exchange. For further research, the re-
search period can be prolonged, use other 
countries as an object, and other variables not 
investigated in this study. 
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